(This is Part 2 of a two-part series. Read Part 1, “Mortgage market recovery hinges on investors.”)

The first article in this series indicated that the current stringency in the mortgage market will ease when investors regain their confidence, which won’t happen until they can see a floor in house prices and a peak in foreclosures. Neither is yet in sight.

Housing markets are always slow to adjust, partly because sellers practice denial and are stubborn about reducing prices, while many buyers defer purchases because they expect prices to decline. Rising foreclosure rates strengthen this attitude by buyers, since buyers understand that foreclosure sales depress prices.

The peak in foreclosures is not yet evident because of the large overhang of interest-rate resets on adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). Since many borrowers facing rate resets will find the new payment unaffordable and will not have the equity or credit needed to refinance, the outlook is for continued increases in foreclosures. The hope, however, is that the relief plan orchestrated by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson will change this expectation.

The Relief Plan

The federal government initiated and to some degree orchestrated the relief plan, the details of which were released Dec. 6. No government funding is involved in it, however. It is a private initiative developed by the American Securitization Forum, a professional organization of firms involved in the securitization process. The plan applies to one category of firms belonging to the organization: servicers of securitized ARMs.

The major goal is to reduce foreclosures of securitized ARMs facing rate resets by extending the initial rates for five years. The eligibility rules are designed to make implementation possible on a wholesale fast-track basis, as opposed to the slow case-by-case basis that is the rule otherwise. It is also intended to be consistent with the contractual obligation of servicers to modify loan contracts only when it is in the interest of the investor.

Borrowers eligible for the fast track:

  • Took out ARMs with initial rate periods of two or three years between Jan. 1, 2005, and July 31, 2007.

  • Face rate resets between Jan. 1, 2008, and July 31, 2010, that will increase their payment by more than 10 percent.

  • Occupy the property as their principal residence, and have been current on their payments for 12 months prior to the rate reset.

  • Will be unable to meet the payment increase, as indicated by a FICO score of less than 660, and not more than 10 percent higher than it was at origination.

  • Will be unable to refinance, either because their original loan was more than 97 percent of property value or because they don’t qualify for FHA financing.

Not eligible are borrowers who have already had their rates reset; borrowers with high-rate fixed-rate mortgages; borrowers who made down payments larger than 3 percent; and borrowers with good FICO scores, or who have substantially improved their scores. Many of these ineligibles are also struggling.

The inequities in this are obvious but should be kept in perspective. Those not eligible are no worse off than they are now, and perhaps a little better off. Treating a significant category of borrowers on a wholesale basis will free up more time and resources for treating other borrowers on a case-by-case basis.

Relief Plan Two

The major shortcoming is not the unequal treatment of groups of equal merit but the fact that the eligible group is too small to have a decisive effect on market expectations. I view it as a good first step — about the most that can be expected from the private sector. It remains for the government to take the next step, which should be aimed at tripling or more the number of borrowers offered relief.

Government should mandate that, with the exception noted below, all ARMs originated after Jan. 1, 2005, with rate margins over 4 percent should have their margins reduced to zero. The margin is the spread added to the interest-rate index in calculating the new rate after the initial rate period ends. The rule should apply whether the loan has reached its first rate reset or not.

The exception would be any mortgage for which the lender can document that the borrower was informed of the margin at least three days prior to closing.

Having government set aside existing private contracts is not a matter to be taken lightly, but in this case it is well-justified. The margin on an ARM is a critically important number to the borrower, but since it doesn’t kick in until the first rate adjustment, most borrowers don’t ask about it. Margins above 4 percent are found only on subprime loans, and these borrowers are the least likely to ask. The fact that government is too inept to make the margin a required disclosure should not absolve lenders of the responsibility for disclosing it.

The writer is professor of finance emeritus at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Comments and questions can be left at www.mtgprofessor.com.

***

What’s your opinion? Send your Letter to the Editor to opinion@inman.com.

Show Comments Hide Comments

Comments

Sign up for Inman’s Morning Headlines
What you need to know to start your day with all the latest industry developments
Success!
Thank you for subscribing to Morning Headlines.
Back to top
Time is running out to secure your Connect Now tickets at the lowest price. Don't miss out on a chance to grow yourself and your business.Learn More×
Up-to-the-minute news and interviews in your inbox, ticket discounts for Inman events and more
1-Step CheckoutPay with a credit card
By continuing, you agree to Inman’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.

You will be charged . Your subscription will automatically renew for on . For more details on our payment terms and how to cancel, click here.

Interested in a group subscription?
Finish setting up your subscription